This paper focuses on market-like coordination mechanisms in multi-agent systems, with applications to business planning. Several fundamental criteria are derived in order to evaluate market-like coordination mechanisms. The central criterion is the e cient allocation of jobs to agents. Assuming a relationship between classes of operational planning problems and certain coordination mechanisms, business planning problems are classi ed on the basis of their relevant attributes. Coordination mechanisms for each of the classes are then introduced on the basis of auction theory and investigated with respect to the trade-o between e ciency and computational tractability. All of the mechanisms prove t o h a ve a common basis: the Vickrey Auction.
Introduction
"Coordination, the process by which an agent reasons about its local actions and the (anticipated) actions of others to try and ensure the community acts in a coherent manner, is perhaps the key problem of the discipline of Distributed A rti cial Intelligence ( D AI). 1 " Nevertheless, in many D AI projects, coordination mechanisms for multi-agent systems (MAS) are applied without providing detailed arguments for their selection, although it is obvious that the coordination principles are crucial for the quality of solutions generated by MAS.
Coordination mechanisms for MAS should be capable of achieving an overall goal while implicitly taking into account di erent local intentions. Their strength should lie in the fact that it is not necessary for single organisational units, information systems/agents, or persons to collect all the local information that is relevant for the overall goal. If we consider coordination to be an assignment of orders/jobs to organisational units represented by agents, the objective i s to achieve a n e cient allocation, i.e., no other assignment leads to a higher degree of goal accomplishment. Hence, we i n vestigate coordination mechanisms in the light of their ability t o p r o vide such an allocation. Beyond this, the trade-o between e ciency and computational tractability i s t a k en into account.
In DAI and especially in modern economic theory, hierarchical principles of coordination are often discussed in comparison to market-like mechanisms. 2 In general, hierarchical mechanisms that require a centralisation of data and competence are not suitable for MAS. While market-like coordination mechanisms implicitly apply local information to determine an allocation, 3 they raise the problem of agents' strategic behaviour.
In this context, strategic behaviour means that it is pro table to reveal prices/costs that do not equal ones individual valuation of orders/jobs and therefore may p r e v ent an e cient allocation and organisational units/agents can increase their pro t by gathering information about the valuations of the others (counterspeculation).
Consequently, we have to identify market-like coordination mechanisms that provide a compelling incentive t o r e v eal one's true valuation, i.e., to prevent strategic behaviour in order to assure the required quality of the solution, and that are computationally tractable.
Within the scope of our project`Decentralised planning in business`(supported by the DFG under contract We 1436/3-1), we analyse planning situations in business, where several organisational units, e.g., pro t centers, jointly try to nd solutions for planning problems in various business domains. In this sense, planning is concerned with the allocation of the limited resources of the participating organisational units, i.e., the assignment of orders/jobs that have to be executed by them. More abstractly, these planning situations can be considered as markets where problem-solving competence and capacities are supplied by the agents whose intention is to obtain pro ts by contributing to the problem-solving process.
Assuming a relationship between certain classes of planning problems and coordination mechanisms, di erent classes of planning problems are identi ed. Then, they have t o be assigned to appropriate market-like m e c hanisms within the MAS in order to coordinate e ciently the competence and capacities of all participating agents with respect to their local intentions and a limited planning horizon.
In this context, we need a suitable economic concept to measure the local valuation of the order(s)/job(s). The concept of disposition speci c contribution margin (in the following: contribution margin) 4 represents an adequate calculus to meet this requirement. Figure 1 illustrates this concept in the domain of transportation planning: starting from an optimised state, each agent inserts the new (set of) order/job(s) with given sales revenue (here: 7.800) and reaches a new optimised state. The di erence in costs generated by t h e s e t wo states (here: 800) deducted from the sales revenue of the order/job yields the contribution margin (here: 7.000). Finally, the pay-o of the agent who gets the job results from deducting the price he has to pay for the job from this contribution margin.
Generally, this contribution margin is di erent for each agent, depending on its individual situation, and it may a l s o h a ve negative v alues. This is of importance if an order/job has to be allocated to one or several units in a group of a liated companies/organisational units, e.g., by c o n tractual guarantee given to a customer or to ensure customers' acceptance, and the job receives a negative v aluation from all of these units. In this case, e cient allocation implies assigning the job to the unit with the best (negative) valuation.
Proceeding from these considerations, the paper is organised as follows: In section 2 some essential characteristics of business planning situations are determined in order to classify planning problems that have to be solved by MAS using marketlike coordination mechanisms. Based on this classi cation, various coordination principles are discussed in section 3 and related to the classes already outlined. Finally, section 4 concludes the paper, presenting the main results and prospects for further research in this area.
Classi cation
The matching of various coordination mechanisms and di erent operational planning problems requires the identi cation of attributes relevant to these problems. Hence, combinations of these attributes lead to di erent classes of planning problems. In this context, it is useful to distinguish between the following attributes: one job versus multiple jobs to be assigned If there is only one job to be assigned to a single organisational unit, a simple assignment problem has to be solved. Assuming that there is more than one job, these jobs can be assigned either successively or simultaneously. This decision is determined by the complexity of the problem-solving process. 5 6 The simultaneous assignment o f j o b s m a y improve the quality of the allocation if each organisational unit can identify its optimum plan for the whole set of orders, whereas successive assignment m a y result in inferior allocation. 7 The valuation of a job-package may di er signi cantly from the sum of the valuations of each job in the package, e.g., if in transportation planning the package leads to a circular tour and reduces idle capacity costs. Hence, such p a c kages have a h i g h e r valuation than the sum of the single valuations. decomposable jobs versus non-decomposable jobs If a job is decomposable, each part can be executed by di erent problem solvers. Decomposition may result in lower overall costs than the execution of the entire job by one organisational unit. Natural decompositions can be found, e.g., in the area of transportation, where orders can be divided by distance and/or freight. Further examples are dynamic load balancing problems in distributed computer systems, scheduling problems in the area of production planning, and portfolio planning in nance, where jobs with natural decompositions can also be found.
xed job-decomposition versus unknown job-decomposition A xed decomposition of the job(s) signi cantly reduces the possibilities of job assignments to organisational units. If the decomposition of a job is unknown, only a complete enumeration of all potential decompositions will ensure an e cient allocation. In transportation planning the decomposition of air freight routes is determined by airports which are the only possible reloading points. Job shop scheduling in the domain of production can also be identi ed as an example of xed job-decomposition. The decomposition of liquids or bulk material for transportation and the allocation of an investment (job) to di erent shares or bonds (units) in the area of portfolio planning represent planning problems with ex-ante unknown job decompositions.
identical jobs/parts of a job versus di erent jobs/parts of a job If the assignment is carried out for identical or di erent jobs or parts of a job, there is a necessity to inform potential problem solvers about each individual part. In this situation, each individual job and package has to be evaluated separately by the organisational units, whereas in the case of identical jobs or parts it is su cient t o v alue one job/part and its multiples. Examples of identical jobs and identical parts of a job, respectively, can be identi ed in container transportation, ow shop scheduling and, in the case of single-instruction-single-data-problems, in load balancing.
Based on these four dimensions, table 1 surveys the assignment problems identi ed above.
Given this classi cation scheme, in the next section we derive adequate coordination mechanisms for each category of planning problems in the table (cells (1)- (9)). (2) (3) (6) (7) (9) 3. Market-like Coordination Mechanisms for Decentralized Operational Planning
As discussed in section 1, we consider coordination mechanisms to determine an e cient allocation of jobs to organisational units within a nite planning horizon. Therefore, the correct valuation of the jobs based on the individual contribution margins of the units is required, even if margins have negative v alues. The mechanisms have to be constructed in such a manner that strategic behaviour is excluded ex-ante, i.e., units behave rational if they reveal their true valuation. Assuming risk-neutral bidders with private job valuations, according to the categories (1)- (9) appropriate market-like coordination mechanisms for MAS are derived which (i) assure an e cient allocation of jobs to organisational units, because (ii) they prevent strategic behaviour (iii) even in the case of negative c o n tribution margins, (iv) are computationally tractable and (v) perform with acceptable communication e ort/costs.
In the following, auctions are presented and investigated with regard to their ability to ful l criteria (i)-(v).
(1) one job non-decomposable
In the English Auction, bidding is open to all participants and bids increase successively until one bidder is left. The job is sold to him at the price of his last bid.
In the Dutch Auction the auctioneer decreases an initial price gradually until the rst bidder stops the procedure. This bidder is awarded the job at the current price.
In the First-Price-Sealed-Bid Auction all participants make one sealed bid. The highest bidder is awarded the object at the price he has o ered.
The Second-price-sealed-bid auction or Vickrey Auction 8 di ers from the First-Price-Sealed-Bid Auction merely by splitting the award and the settlement of the price. Again, the highest bidder is awarded the object but at the price of the second-highest bid.
Each auction yields the same expected value of the price: the second-highest valuation of all participants. 9 An e cient allocation (criterion (i)), i.e., the bidder with the highest valuation receives the job, is not ensured, if the auction mechanism does not prevent strategic behaviour.
In the Dutch Auction and the First-Price-Sealed-Bid Auction bidders anticipate their competitors' valuations for the job because they want to obtain the award and want to maximise their pro t, i.e., the di erence between their own valuation and the price they have to pay. Therefore, they need to gather information about the other bidders in order to make strategic bids. In the English Auction the individual valuations of participants are revealed during open bidding.
Consequently, there is no need for counterspeculation and an e cient allocation is assured. For the Vickrey Auction, it can be shown 8 that it is a dominant strategy to bid ones true valuation (criterion (ii)). This results from the Vickrey principle: a bid does not determine the purchase price, but it determines its rank among all bids. A bidder who makes a bid below h i s v aluation may lose the award. A bid exceeding his individual valuation embodies the risk of a loss if another bid ranks between the price he has o ered and his true valuation of the job. The individual pro t of the bidder who receives the job is the di erence between his own bid and the price. Hence, the English Auction and the Vickrey Auction are candidates for coordination mechanisms in MAS.
With regard to criterion (iii), the English Auction leads to an e cient a l l ocation, even for negative v aluations. Bidding then starts with negative v aluations and the winner of the auction receives his (negative ) b i d a s a p a yment. The Vickrey Auction is also able to handle negative v aluations: the highest bidder receives the job, but instead of paying the second-highest bid he receives the amount o f the second-highest bid as a payment. This is a su cient incentive for each agent to bid for a job with a negative v aluation, because the winner is sure to receive a p a yment that is higher than his own (negative) valuation. As in the case of positive valuations, it can be shown that the bidders will o er their true valuations.
Considering suitable coordination mechanisms for MAS, computational tractability (criterion (iv)) and communication costs (criterion (v)) cannot be neglected. The mechanisms of the English Auction and the Vickrey Auction are tractable, but it is obvious, that on average a sealed-bid auction generates lower communication costs than any open auction, where each bid must be transmitted to all participants/agents. Therefore, the Vickrey Auction is an appropriate coordination mechanism in MAS for the assignment of a single job that is not decomposable. 10 11 (2) multiple jobs non-decomposable jobs are identical If n identical jobs have to be assigned simultaneously to k bidders, the data relating to this job must rst be transmitted to all agents by broadcasting or by t h e u s e o f a blackboard. Agents then calculate their individual contribution margins for 1 to n jobs. In general, the valuation of n jobs will not be n times the valuation of one job, because there is often neither a linear nor a monotonic relation between the valuation of one job and that of its multiples. Agents next transmit their bids to the auctioneer, who determines an e cient allocation by setting up a matrix with the number of jobs in the columns and bidders in the rows. The cells of the matrix represent agents' bids for each n umber of jobs.
An e cient allocation (criterion (i)), i.e., the maximum of the sum of the valuations, can be found by e v aluating this matrix using an assignment algorithm that has to take i n to account that the maximum of assignments in each r o w equals one. Moreover, the sum of the assignments in each column multiplied by the column number has to add up to n at most. Table 2 shows an example consisting of four identical jobs and ve organisational units: The cells with numbers in bold font represent the optimum assignment for the example in table 2. In order to get an e cient allocation, the pricing procedure Varian 12 introduced with his Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) should be applied to this kind of coordination process. In the GVA the price for a bidder k 0 in the e cient allocation is computed as follows: the sum of the bids of all other bidders being awarded a job in this allocation has to be deducted from the sum of the bids in the e cient allocation without the participation of k 0 , i.e., in a matrix with the row of this bidder skipped (see table 3 ).
In the example of table 2, with an e cient allocation of 185 (C gets two jobs, A and B get one job each) the price of bidder C results from deducting the sum of the bids of A and B, i.e., 55 + 30 = 85, from the sum of the bids in the optimum assignment w i t h bidder C skipped (see table 3 with the optimum assignment: 55 (A) + 80 (B) + 20 (E) = 155).
Consequently, C has to pay 155 -85 = 70 for two jobs. His pro t, i.e., the di erence between his valuation (100) and the price he has to pay (70) equals the This pricing procedure assures a compelling incentive (criterion (ii)) to reveal ones true valuation, since each participant receives his contribution to the overall e ciency as his pro t | and this also holds for negative v aluations (criterion (iii)).
Obviously, in the GVA u p t o m i n fk ng+1 computational intractable assignment problems have to be solved. Therefore, an alternative pricing procedure for the Matrix Auction is introduced, 13 the so-called Pricing Per Column (PPC), which helps to reduce the number of assignment problems: the settlement of the prices is based upon the Vickrey principle again. For each number of jobs belonging to the optimum allocation the highest bidder receives the job and has to pay the second-highest bid (here: C has to pay 8 0 f o r t wo jobs). If there is more than one assignment in a column, the mechanism Vickrey describes for m identical objects (multiple auction) is used: 8 m objects (here: jobs) are sold to the m highest bidders at the price of the (m + 1 ) st highest bid (here: A and B both have t o p a y 25 for one job).
In contrast to the GVA, in the PPC it is not a dominant strategy in the gametheoretic sense to announce correct valuations and, hence, there is no stringency for an e cient allocation: a bidder k 0 who expects to have the highest valuation for a job-combination may h a ve a n incentive to assure his participation in a nal allocation by bidding a higher price than his individual valuation. But he risks su ering either a loss if another bid lies between his bid and his valuation for this jobcombination or a loss in the sense of opportunity costs if he would have been better o in the globally e cient allocation. Only in the case of complete information on other bids these risks can be avoided. Assuming that complete information is available, however, counteracts the intentions of decentralized planning (see section 1).
The PPC ensures that each bidder who is awarded a job-combination has a non-negative pay-o and, therefore, a compelling incentive to participate in the bidding process regardless of positive or negative contribution margins (criterion (iii)). Concerning computational tractability (criterion (iv)) it is on the strength of the PPC-mechanism that, apart from the e cient allocation, no additional assignment problems have to be solved. Especially in the case of strong time limitations and a great number of jobs, the PPC is superior to the GVA concerning practical applicability.
(3) multiple jobs non-decomposable jobs are not identical Again, we consider n jobs that are not decomposable. In contrast to (2) , jobs that are not identical have to be allocated, which increases the amount of data transmitted to agents. Agents calculate their valuation for each potential combination of jobs (2 n ; 1 combinations altogether). As in the case of (2), the auctioneer sets up a matrix to identify the optimum allocation. The algorithm for this version of the assignment problem has to take i n to consideration that the number of assignments in each r o w does not exceed one. Beyond this, columns/combinations of jobs that have a n y job in common must not be selected jointly.
The cells with numbers in bold font o f t a b l e 4 s h o w the optimum allocation for an example with three di erent jobs and four organisational units/bidders. In the e cient allocation, B is awarded job-combination f1,3gand C gets job f2g. Analogously to (2), a trade-o between e ciency and computational tractability can be identi ed. Concerning e ciency (criterion (i)), the GVA is superior to the PPC, whereas the PPC is to prefer regarding computational tractability (criterion (iv)). Again, both principles can cope with negative v aluations (criterion (iii)). In this assignment, multiple auctions do not occur because of the restrictions mentioned above.
(4) one job decomposable decomposition given identical parts Identical parts, resulting from a given decomposition of one job can be handled in the same way a s m ultiple identical jobs that are not decomposable. Consequently, the coordination mechanism discussed in subsection (2) can be applied to this kind of allocation problem.
(5) one job decomposable decomposition given parts are not identical This allocation problem is characterised by the same attributes as the problem of multiple di erent jobs that are not decomposable. Hence, the coordination mechanism of subsection (3) is a suitable mechanism for the allocation of di erent parts of one job.
(6) multiple jobs decomposable decomposition given identical parts
The extension of the allocation problem from one job (see (4) and (2)) to multiple decomposable jobs with identical parts does not a ect the coordination mechanism itself, but leads to an increase in the number of elements to be assigned. If job i(i = 1 t o n) is decomposed into p i parts, the numberofidentical parts/numberof columns in the allocation matrix (see table 2) equals P n i=1 p i .
(7) multiple jobs decomposable decomposition given di erent parts Considering n jobs with a xed decomposition into p i di erent parts, we refer to the coordination mechanism in subsections (5) Summing up, in subsections (2)- (7) we have distinguished two matrix based coordination mechanisms, one for identical jobs/parts of a job ( (2), (4), (6)) and another for di erent jobs/parts ( (3), (5), (7)). Within these coordination mechanisms two alternative pricing procedures can be applied: the GVA to ensure e ciency and the PPC to improve the handling of the assignment problem with respect to computational tractability. In the following, these coordination mechanisms are called Matrix Auction. In order to achieve an e cient allocation for jobs with unknown decompositions an allocation mechanism should ensure synergetic e ects by cooperation among agents, e.g., by forming coalitions among organisational units. In this case, besides individual agents, coalitions of agents participate in the bidding. Ex-ante a single organisational unit is opposed to the following trade-o : it does not know whether joining a coalition will be superior to making a bid on its own, i.e., it is not clear to an agent whether its share in the pro t of a coalition will exceed the pro t of a bid made on its own. Thus, the mechanism must guarantee that each organisational unit has an incentive to join a coalition, i.e., a single bidder joining a coalition has to be assured a minimum pro t that equals the pro t he receives when bidding on his own.
The Multistage Extended Vickrey Auction (MEVA) was developed and investigated in detail to solve s u c h problems. 14 In this coordination mechanism, jobs are auctioned o in an iterative bidding process, whose number of iterations equals the number of participating organisational units (k). In each iteration i a Vickrey Auction is carried out and coalitions with i participants are called to make a b i d .
The mechanism is now explained by an example where a maximum of two participants constitute a coalition. In the rst iteration, each single agent m a k e s a b i d for the job. The auctioneer stores all bids and their respective bidders, but does not announce them. In the second iteration the auctioneer calls on coalitions with two participants to make their bids. In this case, bilateral negotiations lead to a joint bid, if it exceeds the maximum of both individual bids. Again, the auctioneer stores all bids and their respective coalitions, but does not announce them. In our example, no coalitions will constitute in iterations 3 to k. Hence, the auctioneer does not receive a n y further bids.
The organisational unit/coalition with the highest bid of all iterations is awarded the job. The price corresponds to the second highest bid of all iterations. In the determination of the price, bids made in the rst iteration are not taken into account if their bidders join a coalition in the second iteration. The reason for this is that no organisational unit would stick to its single o er if it joined a coalition. In order to achieve i n c e n tive compatibility, the auctioneer has to determine a minimum pro t for the following situation: a coalition has made the highest bid of the two iterations and one of both coalition partners made the highest bid in the rst iteration and the highest bid of the rst iteration exceeds the second highest bid of the second iteration. The auctioneer announces the minimum pro t to both participants in the coalition. The agent with the highest bid in the rst iteration receives the minimum pro t and a share in the pro t of the coalition. The share is negotiated among the coalition partners. This implies that the MEVA m e c hanism ensures a compelling incentive (criterion (ii)) to join a coalition and, therefore, guarantees an e cient allocation (criterion (i)).
Considering criterion (iii), the award follows the Vickrey principle and the mechanism can be applied to negative contribution margins. Due to computational tractability (criterion (iv)) the assignment problem within each stage of the MEVA equals the simple assignment problem of (1). The required computational e ort obviously increases within coalition forming due to the negotiations that are inherent in the MEVA. This, however, is not a problem associated with the MEVA any c oordination mechanism allowing cooperation by forming coalitions has to overcome this kind of problem.
(9) multiple jobs decomposable decomposition not given
The extension of the planning problem described in (8) from one job to multiple jobs with an unknown decomposition does not e ect the selection of the coordination mechanism. The determination of an e cient allocation for each o f the jobs based on the MEVA does not guarantee a globally e cient allocation of all jobs. The MEVA has to be applied to the whole set of jobs, because an e cient allocation can only be found as a result of multilateral negotiations among the organisational units on all imaginable parts of the jobs. As in the case of (8), the MEVA leads to an e cient allocation (criterion (i)) by ensuring that each unit has a compelling incentive (criterion (ii)) to join coalitions. As the Vickrey principle is valid, criterion (iii) is ful lled again and concerning computational tractability of the MEVA coordination mechanism the reasoning of (8) still holds.
Finally, the coordination mechanisms discussed in this section are investigated with regard to communication e ort/costs (criterion (v)). As mentioned in (1), sealed bid auctions are superior to all other auctions because of lower mean communication costs. Since (2) to (9) are based on the Vickrey Auction as a sealed bid auction, its characteristics with regard to communication costs will also apply to the mechanisms identi ed in these subsections.
Conclusion
The quality of problem-solving competence in MAS crucially depends on the coordination within the group of participating agents. The main objective o f t h i s paper is to disclose relations between di erent kinds of problems to be solved on the one hand and adequate coordination mechanisms on the other.
Starting with the identi cation of relevant attributes for planning problems in a business environment, a classi cation scheme based on these characteristics is derived. We then point out essential criteria for market-like problem solving (criteria (i) -(v)) and assign suitable coordination mechanisms to all categories in the classi cation scheme (table 5). These three mechanisms share two essential elements: sealed bidding to ensure acceptable communication costs and separation of the award (highest bid) and the price settlement (second-highest bid) in order to avoid strategic behaviour. With respect to practical applications, the trade-o between e ciency in allocating resources and computational tractability has to be solved according to the planning restrictions and to the problem size.
In the context of our project, the main focus of future research should be (bior multilateral) negotiations among coalition partners from a theoretical, economic point of view. In addition, with regard to the implementation of the coordination mechanisms developed, adequate representations and architectures of MAS have t o be realised to handle the planning process. 15 
